Archive for the ‘Congress’ Category

The Defects of the Articles of Confederation, Part 4

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Synopsis:  This is the fourth in a series on the weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation.  Congress was the only institution under the Articles, which led to some problems.

James Madison mentions in The Federalist Papers #38 that putting all government powers in the hands of a few is inherently risky.  He is referring to the fact that Congress was the only institution under the Articles of Confederation, a purely federal union organized under emergency conditions at the beginning of the Revolutionary War.  He writes:

Is it improper and unsafe to intermix the different powers of government in the same body of men?  Congress, a single body of men, are the sole depositary of all the federal powers.

The issues that arose specifically from this feature are due partly to the nature of deliberative legislative bodies, and partly to the concentration of such a wide variety of powers in a few hands. (The lack of adequate powers will be the subject of other editions of this series.)  When an issue of importance came up, there was no mechanism within the Congress to address it, other than to debate or send to a committee for consideration, whereupon some resolution would be passed or defeated.  It ended up being tasked with every type of problem, but was not ideally suited for those that required immediate attention or a definite determination.  It had a nominal judicial function to render certain types of findings in disputes between the states, but no regular judicial function.  It was also charged with managing the war effort and foreign relations, which sometimes require quick action.

But the larger risk was that all of these powers were lodged in one place.  It was common knowledge among the leaders in the founding generation, from their knowledge of history and the observations of the great political theorists, that the best structure for both efficiency and protection of liberties was an inherent division of power within the government.  Certain structures are inherently more efficient for certain objectives; but efficiency in government, carried too far, leads to a grasping for more powers to do more things efficiently; which in turn leads to a reduction in liberty as the government wields greater power.  The best solution was to divide the government into branches with narrowly-defined powers, and let the mutual ambitions of each cancel each other out.  While each branch has its legitimate sphere of power, the jealousy of the other branches keeps it within its proper limits.

One of the political theorists familiar to the founding generation was Charles de Montesquieu, who laid out his observations on divided government in his book The Spirit of Laws (1748).  In Book IX, he points out the one nation on earth in which political liberty was the main objective of its constitution, that is to say, England.  He proceeds to dissect the characteristics of the English system and how it promoted liberty in a general sense, writing in part:

“6.  Of the Constitution of England.  In every government there are three sorts of power: the legislative; the executive in respect to things dependent on the law of nations; and the executive in regard to things that depend on the civil law.

            By virtue of the first, the prince or magistrate enacts temporary or perpetual laws, and amends or abrogates those that have already been enacted.  By the second, he makes peace or war, sends or receives embassies, establishes the public security, and provides against invasions.  By the third, he punishes criminals, or determines the disputes that arise between individuals.  The latter we shall call the judiciary power, and the other simply the executive power of the state.

            The political liberty of the subject is a tranquility of mind arising from the opinion each person has of his safety.  In order to have this liberty, it is requisite the government be constituted as one man need not be afraid of another.

            When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.

            Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive.  Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would then be the legislator.  Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression.

            There would be an end to everything, were the same man or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals.

           As in a country of liberty, every man who is supposed a free agent ought to be his own governor; the legislative power should reside in the whole people.  But since this is impossible in large states, and in small ones is subject to many inconveniences, it is fit the people should transact by their representatives what they cannot transact by themselves.”

The desirability of a system of functional branches was so evident to the delegates to the federal convention, that the first set of resolutions on a new plan, offered by Edmund Randolph on 29 May1787, called for separate legislative, executive, and judicial departments.  On the same day (the fourth of the convention), Charles Pinckney put forward a draft of a constitution; it also called for the same three separate branches.  The next day, Nathaniel Gorham proposed, and his motion was carried, to postpone the discussion of Randolph’s first proposition about the general enlargement of the Articles of Confederation, and consider directly a general revision of the government, in these words [1]:

1.  That a union of the states merely federal will not accomplish the objects proposed by the Articles of Confederation – namely, common defense, security of liberty, and general welfare.

2.  That no treaty of treaties among the whole or part of the states, as individual sovereignties, would be sufficient.

3.  That a national government ought to be established, consisting of a supreme legislative, executive, and judiciary.

The story of the Convention is how the delegates conducted the debate about the exact character of the government; whether it should be entirely national or entirely federal, or a mix; how the members thereof should be chosen, and what the duration of their offices would be; but from this point forward, there was little debate about the necessity and utility of a government with the three familiar branches, instead of Congress alone.

[1]  Jonathan Elliot, Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, in the Convention Held at Philadelphia in 1787, With a Diary of the Debates in the Congress of the Confederation, as Reported by James Madison, Philadelphia; J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1881, Vol. 5, pp. 126-134

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The Defects of the Articles of Confederation, Part 3

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Dear readers:

This paper is available only in .pdf format.  It is the third in a series on the defects of the Articles of Confederation and how they were remedied by the Constitution.  This particular paper discusses the power to make treaties.

Thanks,

EDD

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The Defects of the Articles of Confederation, Part 2

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Dear readers:

This paper is available only in .pdf form owing to its length (6 pages).  It discusses the miltary difficulties encountered by George Washington at the beginning of the Revolution, when he had only temporary militia under his command.  Even when the Articles of Confederation were adopted, the military institutions were dependent upon the states, which were not reliable in providing the necessary men and money.  It closes with a description of how these problems were mitigated in the U. S. Constitution, with explanations using excerpts from the Federalist Papers.

Thanks,

EDD

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The Defects of the Articles of Confederation, Part 1

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Synopsis: This is the first in an occasional series of essays describing the defects of the Articles of Confederation under which the American states organized themselves during the Revolutionary War until the adoption of the Constitution in 1788.  Before addressing the defects of the Confederation that led to the need for a more direct union, this first essay will provide the historical background for the development of the Articles.

It must be recalled that the Revolution of the American colonies against the British was not the result of some grand conspiracy.  The main source of irritation between the colonies and the mother country was a series of Acts of Parliament that constituted undue interference in the colonies’ traditional rights of self-government.  Among the offenses were alteration of the colonial charters, in which land grants were withdrawn and sold again; the imposition of taxes without consulting the colonies; the gradual usurpation of the rights of the colonists to elect their own government; and the intensification of economic burdens designed to benefit England at the expense of the colonies.  All of these were more or less the consequence of King George III’s desire to rule both England and the colonies as a personal autocracy.  But even in the early 1770’s, many people in the colonies preferred to remain Englishmen, hoping that they could somehow reach a compromise with Great Britain.  Only when the British crown sought to make Massachusetts an example by imposing severe constraints on her in 1775 did the colonies awake to the fact that Parliament would not retract any of their excesses.

The colonies were not closely aligned politically during the immediate pre-war period.  There had never been any desire on the part of any of the colonies to form associations or leagues; all were content to operate as independently of each other as possible as direct subordinates to the crown.  But when the British Parliament began to impose repressive measures, some of the colonists saw a need to act together to seek remedies.  They appointed a Congress of delegates from the several colonies to meet in May 1774; its purpose was to defend the rights of the colonies.  It was not entirely clear how to get Parliament’s attention; and Congress as such had no real authority to do much anyway.  The main result of this first Congress was a debate on the legitimate powers held by Parliament, in view of the colonial charters and the traditional rights as Englishmen.  A break with England was not seriously considered yet.  It published a petition calling on Parliament to repeal all the offensive laws passed since 1763.  Suffice to say, it as summarily ignored by Parliament.

By the fall of 1774, the abuses by Parliament against Massachusetts led to the people beginning to reject the powers of the crown outright; this tension promoted by some in America who saw that the Americans were ripe for independence, and by the British, who desired to bring each of the colonies under direct rule by the king.  Eventually the British attempted to end the dispute by arresting leaders of the independence movement; this led to the battles at Lexington and Concord in April 1775.  There was now no going back; the issue of Parliament’s powers, and if they were to have any over the colonies, would be decided by force.

The Second Continental Congress convened in May 1775.  Its charter was to do what was necessary and proper to convince Parliament to undo its abuses.  But with the battle of Bunker and Breed’s Hill in June, the assembly of a large number of militiamen around Boston to threaten the British army there, the establishment of new governments in Massachusetts and New Hampshire, and the expansion of fighting throughout the northeast, Congress became a de facto revolutionary government.  Having gained the confidence of the people, it simply assumed command of the shooting war, appointing Washington as commander, issuing currency on its own credit, and generally organizing the war effort.  The Americans launched an invasion of Canada in August 1775, and the British responded militarily in earnest in October of 1775.  A formal break with Great Britain was now a inevitable, and was announced by the Declaration of Independence on July 4th, 1776.

Congress assumed the powers of a government without any particular authorization outside of the military emergency.  Because the delegates could not agree on the relative weighting by population or wealth, or any other method of apportioning votes, it adopted by default a purely federal system in which each former colony, referring to themselves now as states, had one vote.  Congress appointed a committee on 10 Jun 1776 to devise a permanent government for the thirteen states; it reported out a draft of the Articles of Confederation on 12 Jul 1776.  The Articles were debated from 12 Jul 1776 to 20 Aug 1776 and again from 8 Apr 1777 until their form was agreed to on 15 Nov 1777, which is to say, it was suitable to send to the states for ratification.  On 9 Jul 1778, delegates from eight states ratified the Articles (Connecticut, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and South Carolina).  North Carolina followed suit on 21 Jul 1778, Georgia on 24 Jul 1778; New Jersey on 26 Nov 1778, Delaware on 5 May 1779, and Maryland on 1 Mar 1781.  The Articles required that all thirteen states ratify it before it could go into effect; hence Congress did not convene under the powers granted by the Articles until 2 Mar 1781.

The main features of the Articles, which we will examine more closely, were:

a.         Congress was the only instrument of the federation.  It was to convene on the first Monday in November and continue for a period not longer than six months.  When it adjourned, the government was maintained by an executive committee consisting of one delegate from each state.  Congress elected a President, who was only the nominal leader of Congress, and had the same powers as any other delegate.  Congress published a monthly journal of its proceedings.

b.         Each state was allowed to send between two and seven delegates, but since it was a confederation of states, each state had a single vote.  The delegates were paid by their respective states, not out of a federal treasury.  Instead of administrative departments, the various functions were allocated to committees.  This proved to be inefficient, and later on some functions were allocated to individuals in the interest of expediency.

c.         Congress was granted the following powers: a) to borrow money; b) to appropriate requisitions of money, men, and equipment from each of the states, but could not raise revenue on its own; c) to resolve issues between the states; d) to enact treaties with foreign powers; e) to establish an army and navy; and f) to issue a currency as an obligation to repay loans.  Congress had the power to establish requisitions from the states based on the proportional value of real estate in each state.  The states were then free to raise the requisition by taxing their own citizens.

d.         Concurrence of two-thirds of the states was required for any of the following actions: a) to engage in war; b) to make treaties; c) to coin money; d) to borrow or appropriate money; e) to assign quotas of revenue to the states; and f) to appoint commanders of the army.

e.         The states were required to grant every freeman the same rights and privileges.  Every state was compelled to recognize the records and acts of every other state, and obligated to extradite persons found in their state who were wanted on criminal charges in another state.   Otherwise, all the other powers were left to the states with the following prohibitions: a) a state could not maintain an army or a navy, except for the militia; b) a state could not enter into treaties with foreign nations; c) a state could not form alliances with any of the other states without the consent of Congress; and d) each state was prohibited from entering into any other wars except against the Indians.

f.          The Articles could be amended only by concurrence of all member states.

The succeeding essays will review how these provisions worked in practice at the return of peace.

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