Archive for the ‘Congress’ Category

Regarding the “Three-Fifths Rule”

Regarding The “Three Fifths Rule” <== PDF version

Dear readers:

Due to its extreme length (61 pages), this posting is available only in .pdf format.  It is a complete recounting of the debates in Congress in 1776 and in 1783 as well as the debates in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 regarding how to establish representation in Congress.  As a result of several compromises, and under the assumption that representation should be tied to taxation, a rule in which slaves were counted as three-fifths of a free man was adopted.  As these debates show, the argument was always over revenue and the equitable distribution of representation and how it related to wealth, not to a moral estimate of the worth of black people vs. white people, as some activists would have us believe.

I have included the complete notes from Thomas Jefferson in the original 1776 debates, and all of James Madison’s notes, both from the debates in Congress in 1783 and in the Constitutional Convention of 1787.  This paper will arm you with the facts about the three-fifths provision.

Thanks,

EDD

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Posted in Articles of Confederation, Congress, Constitutional Convention, Early American history, James Madison, U. S. Constitution | No Comments »

On a Balanced Budget Amendment

On_A_Balanced_Budget_Amendment <== PDF version

The idea of adding an amendment to the U. S. Constitution requiring a federal balanced budget has been circulating since the Reagan era.  Although it was proposed a few times in Congress over the years, it was never able to attain the required two-thirds affirmation in either House of Congress, which is necessary before any proposed amendment can be sent to the States for consideration.  But with the large budget deficits of the past 5 years or so, this concept is coming into fashion again.  A recent poll [1] shows that a large majority of Americans now favor such an amendment.  Advocates for a federal balanced budget amendment argue two points. First, they point out that most states have this requirement; the logic being, what is good for the states is good for the federal government.  Their second argument is that the Congress would be forced to prioritize spending and balance those priorities with tax policies necessary to meet the revenue requirements.  It is this lack of restraint, they say, that caused Congress to run up large deficits in nearly every year since the Carter administration.  Generally the advocates allow two exceptions to the balanced budget rule: a) when the nation is in a state of war or some emergency; and b) by a supermajority of both Houses of Congress.

It appears to me that a balanced budget amendment is a bad idea whose time has come.  First, there is no reason to believe that what is good for the states is necessarily good for the federal government, since they have inherently different duties.  States do not have a role in foreign policy; they do not manage wars; they do not manage the currency.  All of these pertain to situations relegated to the federal department because they represent existential threats; the cost of combating these, should it ever become necessary, must be paid.  More than that, they must be paid regardless of any budget deals made by Congress.  As for the stated exceptions, they will either be too restrictive (and thus potentially deadly), or so loose and subject to interpretation as to result in more talk than action.  The great fallacy in the whole concept of exceptions is that no mention is made of who shall determine the conditions under which an exception applies consistent with the separation of powers between the President and the Congress.  Shall conflicting claims of emergencies be arbitrated by the Supreme Court?  If so, we would surrender our fiscal situation to robed masters who may not even understand the question, or who might impose their ideology on the budget.  If not, we are back to the usual rhetoric between the President and the Congress — all pain, no gain.

As to the advocates second line of reasoning, I doubt it will actually restrain Congress.  Keep in mind that a considerable portion of the federal government’s spending is considered “off-budget”.  In this context, “off-budget” refers to expenditures that are not called out on any budget document, including, at the present time, a) Social Security, b) the Postal Service, c) some funding for the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, and d) all of the bailouts.  Fortunately, both on-budget and off-budget status is included when calculating the impact on the national debt.  But under the proposed amendment, balancing the “budget” will be easy: Congress can simply relocate all the excesses to new categories of “off-budget” spending.  It will not force Congress to set priorities in the normal sense of the word.

If any “balanced budget amendment” is to be considered, it must first specify that all revenue and all expenditures by the federal government must be included in the definition of “budget”.  Otherwise, Congress will simply continue to expand the fiscal deceptions and fail to make progress on achieving fiscal stability.  In order to force Congress to face the actual facts, we should require, if anything, a “zero-deficit” amendment rather than a “balanced budget” amendment.

[1]        Sachs/Mason-Dixon, 27 May 2011.  The results indicated that a balanced budget amendment is favored by Republicans and Independents by 81% and 68% respectively; even Democrats favored it by 45%.

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A Comparative Scale of the National Debt

Comparative_Scale_of_the_National_Debt  <== PDF version

We are all aware of the enormous national debt that has been accrued by Congress over the past 35 years or so.  For those too young to recall, the national debt began to accelerate in the mid-1970’s, and has continued to increase steadily since then except for a few years in the late 1990’s.  In this paper, I will relate the total debt to median household income, and calculate the total indebtedness in terms of number of years of median income owed per household, if every household were held to account equally.  This calculation will be done for 2010 and for 1784.  The year 1784 is instructive because that was the year Congress (then under the Articles of Confederation) defaulted on the national debt as it then existed.

The mark of an educated mind is to be content with an approximation as Aristotle informs us.  We do not have the data necessary to make a computation to nine decimal places, but we can, with a few assumptions, get a reasonable sense of the relative magnitude of the indebtedness in 1784 compared to the current total national debt.  To start, we shall use round numbers as shown next.

In round numbers, according to the 2010 census, the median household income is about $50,000, the total national debt is about $14,000,000,000,000, the total population is about 310,000,000, and the total number of households in the U. S. is about 110,000,000.  If we divide the total debt by the number of households, we obtain an average indebtedness per household of about $125,000 in round numbers.  If we divide this by the median income per household, we obtain 2.5 — this is the number of years of total income the median household would have to pay if each were held equally responsible for paying the national debt.  How does this compare to 1784?

The census closest to 1784 is the one in 1790, which showed that the total population was 3,893,635, of which 694,280 were slaves.  There was an influx of people in the few years just prior to 1790, so, as an approximation, we will assume the population in 1784 was about 3,500,000.  The census collected data on households, but they were mixed in with the number of males and females above age 16.  To avoid this problem, we will assume that the ratio of households to population was the same then as now, that is, about 1:2.8.  This gives, in round numbers, about 1,250,000 households in 1784.

The median income data is a little more difficult.  McMaster [1] reports that the median wage in Boston for a typical workman was 12 shillings per week, which is 60% of a Massachusetts pound.  The Massachusetts pound was set at 1289 grains of silver.  For convenience, we will convert the Massachusetts pound to Spanish Milled Dollars (SM$), which was the de facto currency of that time; the milled dollar was reckoned at 386.7 grains of silver.  Hence, the weekly wage of a workman was SM$ 2 Spanish milled dollars (surprisingly, an exact number).  Therefore, at 52 weeks per year, the median annual income was approximately SM$ 104.

It may be objected here that most people in 1784 did not work for money wages.  That is true; but it is also true that a money-wage is nothing more than a convenient conversion factor that represents the amount of labor necessary to procure the necessities of life.  So, the typical household had to expend a certain amount of labor whether it was paid in money or not, and if held responsible for a fraction of the debt, that payment would have to be made either in-kind, in-labor, by taxation on land, or by converting a portion of labor to money.  In the end, the debt is paid by the proceeds of labor and land, whether represented directly in money or not.  We may therefore convert all households, whether agrarian or wage-earners, to the equivalent of money.

The total debt in 1784, converted from colony pounds, French livres, depreciated Continentals, and hard money was SM$ 68,000,000 at the above-mentioned conversion rate [2].  Performing the same calculations as before, we obtain a per-household share of the national debt as SM$ 55, which is 0.5 years of median income per household necessary to pay its share of the debt.

Now compare our two results.  In 1784, the total debt translated into about a half-year of median income per household; now, it translates into two-and-a-half-years of median household income — a factor of five larger.

It may be objected that the dollar is worth a lot less today than in 1784, and this comparison is not valid.  But note that I have compared debt in 1784 with income in 1784 in consistent units, and likewise for modern times.  I have not tried to compare dollars now with dollars then; had I done so, the objection would be perfectly justified.

The Congress in 1784 could not pay that debt because of a defect in the Articles of Confederation: the Articles did not give Congress authority to raise a direct tax or to levy import duties.  It could only ask the states for money, and often did not receive the amount requisitioned.  Now, Congress has arbitrary power to tax, yet we will have great difficulty paying this debt because of a defect in the members of Congress: they believe they have a power to spend borrowed money on anything they want, whether authorized in the Constitution or not.

[1]   John B. McMaster, A History of the People of the United States from the Revolution to the Civil War, New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1900, p. 96.

[2]   Gaillard Hunt, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress, Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1928, Vol. 24, pp. 206-210 and 276-287; Vol. 25, pp. 954, 955

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Congress Consults With Constituents

CongressConsultsWithConstituents   <== PDF version

An interesting story by Nancy Cordes at CBS News called “Is Anyone in Washington Minding the Store?” (see https://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/04/22/eveningnews/main20056610.shtml?tag=stack) reveals that Congress has chosen to take a two-week vacation.  In doing so, they are deferring several important issues, especially the federal budget.  But, as Ms. Cordes notes at the end of her column, the Members of Congress regard this time away from Washington essential to their duties because it gives them the opportunity to “spend more time in their home districts.” 

I hope they are not spending too much time back home discussing local issues, when the main focus of Congress should be on national issues.  I would think that each Member of Congress knows the sentiments of the people of his state or district fairly well by now — they were elected by those same people, weren’t they?  If they don’t know them by now, maybe Congress should only be in session for a few months out of the year, so the Members can spend time actually living in their districts.  It seems Congress has gradually drifted toward the federalization of local issues as expressed in the federal budget rather than concentrating its efforts where they belong, on the truly national issues.  In order to pass legislation that is beneficial for the entire nation, the Members of Congress would do well to become familiar with how that legislation would affect all the states, not just their own.  The power to enact a budget naturally depends on the power to tax; the power to tax is most wisely used by those who have a general sense of the conditions in all the states.  As Hamilton pointed out in The Federalist #35:

“There is no part of the administration of government that requires extensive information and a thorough knowledge of the principles of political economy, so much as the business of taxation.  The man who understands those principles best will be least likely to resort to oppressive expedients, or to sacrifice any particular class of citizens to the procurement of revenue.  It might be demonstrated that the most productive system of finance will always be the least burdensome.  There can be no doubt that in order to obtain a judicious exercise of the power of taxation, it is necessary that the person in whose hands it is should be acquainted with the general genius of the people at large, and with the resources of the country.”

Madison continued this line of reasoning in The Federalist #57:

“The attentive reader will discern that the reasoning here used, to prove the sufficiency of a moderate number of representatives, does not in any respect contradict what was urged on another occasion with regard to the extensive information which the representatives ought to possess, and the time that might be necessary for acquiring it.  This information, so far as it may relate to local objects, is rendered necessary and difficult, not by a difference of laws and local circumstances within a single State, but of those among different States.  Taking each State by itself, its laws are the same, and its interests but little diversified.  A few men, therefore, will possess all the knowledge requisite for a proper representation of them.  Were the interests and affairs of each individual State perfectly simple and uniform, a knowledge of them in one part would involve a knowledge of them in every other, and the whole State might be competently represented by a single member taken from any part of it.  On a comparison of the different States together, we find a great dissimilarity in their laws, and in many other circumstances connected with the objects of federal legislation, with all of which the federal representatives ought to have some acquaintance.  Whilst a few representatives, therefore, from each State may bring with them a due knowledge of their own State, every representative will have much information to acquire concerning all the States.”

But our Members of Congress prefer to focus on local issues, to ensure that those are given preferential treatment as best as possible in federal legislation.  It is much to be preferred that Congress concentrate its energies on the few things it ought to be doing, that is, develop policies at the national level, consistent with the best interests of the nation as a whole.

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